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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the trial Court err in apparently determining 
that the payments made were from the separate funds of 
William Gregg and did not come from Karen who was fully 
obligated to pay on the note to Utah State Credit Union. 
II. Did the trial Court err by failing to categorize the 
payments to Utah State Credit Union as voluntary payments 
under 11 USC §524 (f). 
III. Assuming, arguendo, that the trial Court correctly 
determined the payments made to Utah State Credit Union 
were from the separate funds of William Gregg and that 
these payments were not voluntary payments within the 
meaning of §524 (f), did the trial Court use the wrong 
measure for computing damages. 
IV. Did the trial Court err by failing to make written 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to support its 
decision. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
§7-9-32 (1), Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 1953. Joint accounts 
- Accounts providing for payment to designated person on death of 
owner or owners. 
(1) If a deposit or share account is opened in any 
credit union in the name of two or more persons, whether minor 
or adult, in such form that the money in the account is payable 
to the survivor or survivors, the account and all additions to 
it are considered held by these persons as joint tenants or 
owners. 
Rule 52 (a) (b) (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Findings by the 
Court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find 
the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in 
granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall 
similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for 
findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of 
1 
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be 
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the 
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the 
findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded 
in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in 
an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The 
trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb), 
The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of 
the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 
12(b), 50(a) and (b) , 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more 
than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later 
than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its 
findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment 
accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new 
trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in 
actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may 
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the 
question has made in the district court an objection to such 
findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for 
judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions 
of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the 
trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the 
minutes. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A 
REFUND OF THE CASH PAID TO THE CREDIT UNION. 
A. Respondents' Reliance On The Invalidity Of 
The Reaffirmation Agreement Is Without Merit. 
Respondents claim they are entitled to a refund of cash 
paid to the Credit Union because the signed note was an invalid 
reaffirmation agreement. This argument, however, does not 
address the actual issues raised by this case. 
The Credit Union admits it did not have a valid 
reaffirmation agreement with the Greggs. As to Mr. Gregg, the 
signed agreement was therefore invalid and he was under no 
obligation to pay. Mrs. Gregg, however, was not in bankruptcy. 
The agreement as to her was immaterial as she was fully 
obligated under the terms of the original agreement. 
None of the cases cited by Respondents were similar to 
this case. In each of those cases all signators to the contract 
had filed bankruptcy. Therefore, in those cases the respective 
Courts ruled that the reaffirmation was invalid and terminated 
all rights of the creditor to any proceeds under the contract. 
Such is not the case here. 
Respondentsf cases have additional critical variances 
from the instant case. In the case of In Re Mandrell, 50 B.R. 
593 (Bkrtcy D. Tenn. 1985), there was a determination that the 
security agreement itself was invalid. In In Re Gardner, 57 
B.R. 609 (Bkrtcy D. Me. 1986) the debtor did not owe any 
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obligation, nor was it a case involving a security agreement. 
Respondents1 citation to In Re Kendrick, 75 B.R. 451 
(Bkrtcy N.D. Ga. 1987) actually demonstrates that even if the 
money were determined to be paid out of the separate funds of 
William Gregg and further that such payments were shown to be 
involuntary, the court used the wrong measure of damages in not 
considering the depreciation of the collateral between the time 
of filing the bankruptcy and the time the collateral was 
repossessed. 
B. Respondents1 Assertion That The Issue Of 
Joint Ownership Of Funds Was Not Raised 
At Trial Is Clearly In Error. 
Respondent seeks to dismiss the issue of joint ownership 
of funds by claiming that "matters not admitted into evidence 
before the trier of fact will not be considered on appeal." 
(Respondents Brief, p. 17.) 
The matter was raised at trial, however, and was a 
central issue in the case. Aside from Respondent William 
Gregg's self-serving statements referred to in Respondents1 
Brief (p. 17) the issue was argued in closing arguments by 
counsel for the Appellant (Transcript, pp. 41, 45). This is 
not a new matter, but rather one argued before the trial court 
and comprising a key issue. 
A determination that the money paid was from joint funds 
eliminates any claim William Gregg might have. Both the case 
law as set forth in Appellant's Brief, at page 7, and Utah 
statutory law as represented by §7-9-32, Utah Code Annotated, 
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make it clear as a matter of law that the money pooled by the 
Greggs in their joint bank account was the property of them 
both. Therefore, as a matter of law the Credit Union was 
entitled to keep the money paid. To hold otherwise is to invite 
fraud where, as here, only one spouse declares bankruptcy but 
the debtors many months later demand all their money back 
claiming it all belonged to the partner declaring bankruptcy. 
Respondents1 citation to §30-2-4 and §30-2-5 of the Utah 
Code Annotated is also unpersuasive. There is no question of 
what Mrs. Gregg could have done with her funds or that she could 
have funds. The point is that the Greggs chose to pool their 
funds, and therefore Mr. Gregg cannot now claim the payment came 
from his separate funds. 
II. THE PAYMENTS WERE VOLUNTARY AND THEREFORE 
PROPERLY RECEIVED BY APPELLANT. 
As part of their argument Respondents cite a number of 
problems with respect to their use of the collateral. Such 
problems were neither the responsibility nor the concern of the 
Credit Union. It was the Respondents' responsibility to 
maintain the vehicle in working condition and it was certainly 
not the Credit Union's fault that the Respondents did not like 
to ride their motorcycle in the cold. None of these 
circumstances change the central fact that the Respondents chose 
to make payments to keep the vehicles and keep the Credit Union 
from filing suit against Mrs. Gregg for the balance due on the 
note. 
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Respondents also cite the fact that the Credit Union 
continued to work with the Greggs, even after they became late 
in their payments as further proof that payments were not volun-
tary. All this demonstrates that the Credit Union bent over 
backwards to allow the Greggs to keep the collateral. It says 
nothing at all as to the voluntariness of the payment. 
Even though the facts clearly show voluntary payments, 
it should be remembered that this only becomes an issue if it 
were determined that William Gregg was paying the debt from his 
own separate funds, which as shown under Point I is not the case 
here. 
III. THE ISSUE OF THE CORRECT MEASURE OF 
DAMAGE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
The issue of the correct measure of damages was clearly 
raised directly in the lower court. Respondents argued they 
were entitled to a refund of the money paid to the Credit Union 
and the Credit Union argued Respondents were not entitled to 
anything. 
However, with no findings of fact or conclusions of law, 
it is impossible to determine the rationale the Court used for 
determining the amount of damages. What is clear is that 
instead of giving the measure of damages which were correct as a 
matter of law, as set forth in In Re Kendrick, 75 B.R. 741 
(Bkrtcy N.D. Ga. 1987), the Court gave Respondent William Gregg 
a refund of all sums paid. 
6 
Such a determination was clearly erroneous and should be 
reversed by this Court. 
IV. LACK OF FORMAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DO REQUIRE REVERSAL 
OR VACATION OF JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE. 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is clear. 
It requires that "in all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury or with an advisory jury, the Court shall find the facts 
specifically and state separately its conclusions of law there-
on. " Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (emphasis added). 
Likewise, the exceptions are clearly stated in the rule 
itself. They are (1) by default or by failing to appear at the 
trial; (2) by consent in writing, filed in the case; or (3) by 
oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. None of the 
exceptions are applicable in this case. Appellant did not 
default or fail to appear at trial. No waiver was requested or 
granted in any of the pleadings filed in this case. And 
finally, neither Appellant nor its counsel consented to such a 
waiver in open court nor is such a waiver found in the minutes. 
Respondent claims "it has been held by our court: that 
even in situation where a waiver is definitely not permissible, 
if a waiver is attempted, or no steps are taken at the trial 
level to obtain findings and conclusions, an Appellant should 
not be allowed to try and take advantage of the lack of findings 
and conclusion on appeal by demanding reversal." Respondent's 
Brief, p. 8, 9. To support its assertion the Respondent cites 
Farrell v. Turner, 482 P.2d 117 (Utah 1971). 
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However, the findings in Farrell are completely 
inapposite to Respondent's assertion. In Farrell the Plain-
tiff-Appellant "through her counsel... stipulated that findings 
of fact or conclusions of law should be waived..." Farrell at 
119. The Court found that "a party who waives the making and 
entering of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law cannot take 
advantage of the failure of the Court in that regard..." Supra, 
at 119. 
There is nothing in the Farrell case or the Rule sup-
porting Respondent's assertion that an Appellant has a duty to 
try and force the trial Court to make findings and conclusions 
nor is there any support for the proposition that an Appellant 
is not entitled to reversal where such findings and conclusions 
are not made. Farrell simply stands for the rule set forth in 
Rule 52 (c) (3) that if a waiver is made in open court, the 
court has no duty to enter written findings and conclusions. 
Respondent further claims that no findings and 
conclusions were required because the trial Court's decision was 
largely based upon stipulated and undisputed facts. Such an 
argument is contrary to the plain language of the Rule, which 
clearly sets forth the exceptions. In LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. 
Peterson, 78 Utah 2d 260, 420 P.2d 615, (1966), the Utah Supreme 
Court set forth the purpose of imposing the duty to make 
findings of facts on the trial court. 
The right to resort to the courts for the 
adjudication of grievances and the settlement of 
disputes is a fundamental and important one. An 
indispensable requisite to fulfilling that 
responsibility is the determination of question 
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of fact upon which there is disagreement; it is 
for that reason that the rules impose the duty 
of making findings on all material issues, 
LeGrand Johnson Corp., at 616. 
The Utah Supreme Court elucidated a second critical 
reason for requiring findings of facts and conclusions of law in 
Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953 (Utah 1983). In Bastian, the 
Court found that "Proper findings are essential to enable this 
Court to perform its function of assuring that the findings 
support the judgment and that the evidence supports the 
findings.11 Bastian, at 957. Findings of Fact are therefore the 
basis upon which appellate courts can review judgments. See 
also Dover Elevator v. Hill Mangum Investments, 766 P.2d 424, 
426 (Utah App. 1988). 
Respondents also argue that this court should hold that 
findings of fact and conclusions of law were not necessary in 
this case based upon the Memorandum Decision of the trial court 
and so called "stipulated or undisputed facts.11 
A trial judge's memorandum decision can be regarded as 
findings of fact but only as to those findings recited therein. 
Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1977). Such findings are 
only acceptable where the memorandum contains findings of fact 
that are in sufficient compliance with subdivision (a) of Rule 
52. Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 4 Utah 2d 344, 294 
P.2d 689 (1956). The memorandum decision filed in this case 
simply stated that the Defendant was awarded judgment against 
the Plaintiff. It is clearly not sufficient to meet the 
standard set forth in Rule 52. 
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For the proposition that stipulated facts or undisputed 
facts are sufficient to allow this Court to ignore a lack of 
formal findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Respondent 
cites this court's ruling in Dover Elevator v. Hill Mangum 
Investments, 766 P.2d 424 (Utah App. 1988). However, this case 
is clearly distinguishable from Dover Elevator on two grounds. 
First, in Dover Elevator the facts were stipulated, in the 
current case there are no stipulated facts. Second, in Dover 
Elevator the case had been decided essentially on a motion for 
Summary Judgment. Rule 52 (a) specifically provides that 
findings and conclusions are not required where a case is 
resolved on motion. The current case was not decided on motion 
but on full trial which involved the testimony of witnesses 
including the respondent. An expansion of the Dover Elevator 
case holding to cover this case would clearly be contrary to the 
explicit language of Rule 52 and its fundamental purpose as set 
forth by the Utah Supreme Court in LeGrand. 
Respondents would have this Court comb through the trial 
transcript and try to determine which statements of the witness-
es comprised "undisputed facts.11 Or more egregiously still, 
they would like to go through the transcript themselves to pick 
and choose what they feel are the undisputed facts and have this 
court rule based on these. The appellate court simply cannot do 
this as a matter of law. 
This case was complex and required the interpretation of 
Utah Statutes, Utah common law and Federal Bankruptcy Law. It 
also required the court to make determinations of the relative 
T A 
veracity of the witnesses. Without Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law it is impossible to determine what issues the 
trial court addressed and the rationale for its decision on or 
what weight it placed on the testimony it heard. 
This Court should therefore revoke the current judgment 
and remand this case for further hearing and findings. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the ruling of the 
Trial Court should be reversed or in the alternative vacated and 
remanded for a new trial for the following reasons: 
1. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law in not 
finding the money paid to the Credit Union was the joint proper-
ty of the Respondents and therefore not claimable by William 
Gregg. 
2. The determination of the measure of damages was 
incorrect as a matter of law. 
3. The Trial Court erred in not finding that even if 
any payments had been made from William Gregg's separate funds, 
the payments were voluntary. 
4. The Trial Court failed to make findings and con-
clusions as required by Rule 52. 
Respectfully submitted this 2^ day of September, 
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course, she got something out of it. Ke said he used it in 
his work, he said lie wanted to keep it, I'he notes that the 
credit union gave said that he tried,—he was trying to fix 
the thing, he wanted to keep then. And to say that she 
received no benefit out of that is incredible; certainly, she) 
received the benefit out of it, they're both working, they 
money croes into the family pot and for the Court to—to be 
urged to isolate the payments and say he *s the only one that 
made any of the payments because 1 wrote the checks or 
because I signed the checks, well, that's preposterous. 
Let me address just a minute the cases that are 
cited by Ilr. Giliman, and I think chat all of them can be 
easily differentiated or distinguished from what we've got 
here. First, the liandrell case that was cited by lir. Giliman 
In that case, there was no valid security interest. Uhat 
they found out was there was a reaffirmation that was 
consummated in that case, but then they found out afterwards 
that the creditor had no valid security interest and the 
debtor said, well, if wefd known there was no valid security 
interest, we wouldn't have signed the reaffimation. There 
was a mutual mistake in fact, and under the Tennessee law, 
the Bankruptcy Court said, well, it!s a mutual mistake of 
fact, we're going to rescind the agreerent. And that's in 
fact what they did, and part of the rescission damages is 
that you restore everyone to the status quo; you give him his 
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note, we've got the convulsion of the threat against 
Mrs. Gregg and so forth. I don't think that we can say 
that well, this is a 5 24F voluntary payment. It simply 
doesn't fit that, 
r-nd we would add to the Court, in one of the 
decisions that we cited, that notwithstanding the fact that 
we argue with voluntariness here where the C.P.A. said, 
well, I'll Make up £4,500 that my carrier won't, volunteer 
to do it, the Court said no, we're not going to let you 
keep that money. 
I think the only other thine that I would address 
at this point is the proposition that it's somehow ridiculous) 
to say that husband and wife can't keep their funds, 
expenses and assets segregated, as Ilr. Gregg's testimony has 
been that they have. I think under our statutes, under 
property rights, Title 30, Chapter 2, it very well delineates) 
how separate debts and assets can be held, managed and taken 
care of by husband and wife, notwithstanding that they're 
still married and still living together. 
The fact of the ratter is Mrs. Grea^ is not a 
driver, she worked at here, she stays at hone, she doesn't 
need these cars. 
That brings up the final point that I would like to) 
make to the Court, ^e're talking here about an obligation 
which they say was voluntarily encered into because kr. Gregg) 
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